

CONCEPTE RDIA Cyber security cOmpetenCe fOr Research anD InnovAtion

DDoS Clearing House for Europe L'IHEDN, 08-12-2021

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Partners: SIDN, UT, TI, FORTH, UZH, SURF, ULANC, CODE







In this presentation

- DDoS attacks
- Introduction to the DDoS Clearing House
- The DDoS Clearing House testbed
- Demonstration





About DDoS

- Overwhelming a victim with network traffic
- "Bot nets" send traffic
- Vulnerable services on the internet amplify the traffic
- Mitigation by "scrubbing services"

High-impact DDoS Examples



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
DDoS Clearing House

- Share summarized information about DDoS attacks
- Core service of an anti-DDoS Coalition: collaboratively fight DDoS
- Broaden the view of the DDoS landscape
- 3 key components: Dissector, DDoS-DB, Converter





DDoS Clearing House



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DDoS fingerprint

- Summary of the DDoS attack
- Meta-data such as protocols, attack types, nr. of packets, duration, etc.

```
attack vector: [
     ip_proto: [
       "UDP"
     highest_protocol: [
       "UDP"
     frame_len: [
       132
     udp length: [
       28
     dstport: [
       8989
     fragmentation: [
       False
     src_ips: [
       "109.74
       "172.10
       "198.74
       "97.107
       "172.10
     attack vector key: "e7a48aec33750e1ecc64ee3a33db8bbc2cd42cce508aaf6d91956ad83fb9d455"
     one_line_fingerprint: "{'ip proto': 'UDP', 'highest protocol': 'UDP', 'frame len': 132,
     'udp length': 28, 'dstport': 8989, 'fragmentation': False, 'src ips': 'omitted'}"
start time: "2021-09-15 14:21:41"
duration sec: 13.0
total dst ports: 1
avg_bps: 65563
total packets: 6457
ddos attack key: "343e479a35aee4dfd878a6cdedf85a2d855a25e669a38049957c1687b8fe1958"
key: "343e479a35aee4d"
total ips: 5
file_type: "PCAP"
tags: [
  "SINGLE VECTOR ATTACK"
  "UDP"
   "UDP_SUSPECT_LENGTH"
submitter: "sidnlabs'
submit timestamp: "2021-10-13T12:55:21.822069"
shareable: False
```

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Clearing House testbed


• Goal: pilot in Dutch Anti-DDoS Coalition & Italian consortium

• Obstacle: production systems and legal agreements

• Solution: representative environment in which to test the technical developments of the Clearing House










Dissector



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Converter



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Member 1

- 1. Member 1 requests traffic through dashboard
- 2. Traffic simulator sends traffic to Member 1
- 3. Attack traffic is analysed by Dissector
- 4. Resulting fingerprint is uploaded to DDoSDB
- 5. Member 2 queries DDoSDB for fingerprints
- 6. Converter creates mitigation rules from fingerprint

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DDoSDB.eu

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Member 2




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- 7. Member 2 requests the same attack previously sent to Member 1
- 8. Attack is largely blocked by generated mitigation rules

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Member 1








Demonstration

• Virtual anti-DDoS coalition with SIDN and SURF

• Recorded a demo video










000 🛅 thijsvandenhout — thijs@ddosch-target: ~/ddos_dissector — ssh -L 5601:localhost:5601 ddosch-target — 110×25 [thijs@ddosch-target:~/ddos_dissector\$ # Capture traffic on port 8989: [thijs@ddosch-target:~/ddos_dissector\$ sudo tcpdump -ni nflog:8989 -w udpflood.pcap tcpdump: listening on nflog:8989, link-type NFLOG (Linux netfilter log messages), capture size 262144 bytes




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




















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More content online:

sidnlabs.nl nomoreddos.org github.com/ddos-clearing-house

Home Consortium Downloads Workshop

POSTED APRIL 9, 2020 ADMIN CONCORDIA

DDoS attack landscape

Increasing the Netherlands' DDoS resilience together

First lessons learned from setting up a national anti-DDoS initiative, part I of III

The Dutch Anti-DDoS Coolition is a national consortium of seventeen organisations from various sectors (e.g. ISPs, banks, government agencies and law enforcement) committed to fighting DDoS attacks tagether. In this series of three blogs, we'll first discuss the rationale behind our initiative, then describe a technical facility called the DDoS clearing house that enables coalition members to automatically measure and share the properties of DDoS attacks (e.g. attack duration and source IP addresses), before finally reviewing our key challenges, the lessons learned and the way forward. Our lessons learned are an inportant input for a 'cookbook' to set up anti-DDoS coalitions elsewhere in Europe.

Note: we're using two types of reference in this blog series: hyp 4 ▷ O A □ a nonoreddss.orgunb information, while numbers between straight brackets ([]) link to i x seeing and sum [cuest. A Kaskar papers.

No More Di

A Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attack overwhelms a network with network the ability to service legitimate requests from their clients, simultaneously transmitting traffic from a large number of machines dis example by infecting those machines with malware that carries out the at attacking machines exhausts a server's resources (rather than swampir attacker could reneatedly start, a logon session with the server, thus forci



Developing and running a

rticle by: Thijs van den Hout, Remco Poortinga-van Wijnen, Cristian Hesselman, Christos Papachristos, mr. Karin Vink CIPPE

We have created a distributed testbed that enables us to realistically test the <u>DDoS Clearing</u> <u>House</u>: a system that enables organisations to handle DDoS attacks more proactively by automatically sharing measurements of the DDoS attacks they handle. Our testbed allows us to temporarily skip typically time-consuming organisational processes such as setting up data sharing agreements and deploying software in production systems, which helps to advance the system towards a polic and a production version. We discuss the motivation for developing our testbed, its requirements, implementation and our lessons learnt. We're developing the Clearing House and the testbed as part of the CONCORDIA project, and we'll be using both in the Dutch Anti-DDoS Coalition.



