

# Retrofitting Post-Quantum Cryptography in Internet Protocols: A Case Study of DNSSEC


Moritz Müller, Maran van Heesch, Jins de Jong, Benno Overeinder, Roland van Rijswijk-Deij


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- Signatures are transmitted with <u>every</u> response
- In some cases <u>multiple keys and signatures</u> in the same response
- Multiple signing algorithms are already supported
- Transport usually is UDP, with TCP fallback

# **Applying PQC to DNSSEC**

### Restrictions

- Payload > 1,232 bytes often causes fragmentation
- Resolvers validate thousands of signatures per second
- Signing in some cases on the fly

### **Requirements for Algorithms**

Signature Size: ≤ 1,232 bytes Validation Performance: Signing Performance:


 $\geq$  1000 sig/s  $\geq$  100 sig/s

## Finding the Right Algorithm

Algorithm	Public Key	Signature	Sign/s	Verify/s
Falcon-512	0.9kB	0.7kB	~ 3,300	~20,000
Rainbow-la	149kB	64B	~ 8,300	~ 11,000
RedGeMSS128	445kB	35B	~ 540	~ 10,000

## Preparing DNSSEC for PQC


- Out of band key distribution
- Increased TCP support



# Preparing DNSSEC for PQC

- Out of band key distribution
- Increased TCP support

• We are currently implementing and testing our proposals



# **Thank You!**

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