


Domain Name System Security

Moritz Müller

SIDN and SIDN Labs

- *Stichting Internet Domeinregistratie Nederland* (SIDN)
- Critical infrastructure services
 - Lookup IP address of a domain name (almost every interaction)
 - Registration of all .nl domain names
 - Manage fault-tolerant and distributed infrastructure
- Labs = research department
- www.sidnlabs.nl



.nl = the Netherlands
17M inhabitants
6.0M domain names
3.3M DNSSEC-signed
2.5B DNS queries/day


Agenda

- Introduction to the DNS
- Attacks on the DNS
- DNSSEC to the rescue
- Other challenges to the DNS



The Domain Name System

The UK has a 10.7 million-strong .uk domain. Back in 1985, .uk was one of the first ever country-code domains to be created. In 2014, shorter 'website.uk' domains were made available alongside 'website.co.uk' for the first time.



The Basics


- Since 1983
- Most known for translating domain names to IP addresses
- Precedes almost any connection setup on the Internet
- Also other information stored in the DNS
 - Text: TXT
 - Mail servers: MX
 - SPF/DKIM/ DANE
 - many [more...](#)

The DNS components




Would like to visit www.bth.se.

7



Zone file of: **bth.se**

| domain name | TTL | class | type | value |
|-------------|-------|-------|------|---|
| @ | 86400 | IN | SOA | netsrv10.bth.se. hostmaster.litnet.se. (2015101478 ; serial ... 900 ; minimum (15 minutes)) |
| | 86400 | IN | NS | sunic.sunet.se. |
| | 86400 | IN | NS | netsrv10.bth.se. |
| | 86400 | IN | NS | ns3.ltblekinge.se. |
| www | 86400 | IN | A | 213.52.129.125 |
| www | 86400 | IN | AAAA | 2a01:7e00::f03c:91ff:fe18:15af |



Authoritative Name Server

The DNS components



Recursive
Resolver



bth.se

Authoritative Name Server

Recursive resolver usually provided by:

- your Internet Service Provider (ISP)
- your local network (e.g. university, coffee shop, ...)
- a cloud provider (e.g. Google [8.8.8.8], Cloudflare [1.1.1.1])

The DNS lookup



What is the IP
address of
www.bth.se.



Recursive
Resolver



Root



.se




bth.se

Authoritative Name Server




The DNS lookup



- .se is the “parent” of bth.se
- Root (.) is the “parent” of .se

The DNS lookup




Response of the root

| domain name | TTL | class | type | value |
|---------------------------|--------|-------|------|----------------|
| <i>Answer Section</i> | | | | |
| - | | | | |
| <i>Authority Section</i> | | | | |
| se. | 172800 | IN | NS | a.ns.se. |
| se. | 172800 | IN | NS | b.ns.se. |
| | | | | ... |
| <i>Additional Section</i> | | | | |
| a.ns.se. | 172800 | IN | A | 192.36.144.107 |
| b.ns.se. | 172800 | IN | A | 192.36.133.107 |
| | | | | ... |


Root

```
dig +multiline @a.root-servers.net www.bth.se
```

The DNS lookup



The DNS lookup




Response of .se

| domain name | TTL | class | type | value |
|---------------------------|-------|-------|------|------------------|
| <i>Answer Section</i> | | | | |
| - | | | | |
| <i>Authority Section</i> | | | | |
| bth.se. | 86400 | IN | NS | sunic.sunet.se. |
| bth.se. | 86400 | IN | NS | netsrv10.bth.se. |
| | | | | ... |
| <i>Additional Section</i> | | | | |
| netsrv10.bth.se. | 86400 | IN | A | 194.47.129.10 |
| sunic.sunet.se. | 86400 | IN | A | 192.36.125.2 |
| | | | | ... |


Root

```
dig +multiline @a.ns.se www.bth.se
```

The DNS lookup





The DNS lookup





The DNS lookup




The IP of
www.bth.se. is
213.52.129.125



The DNS lookup



The DNS lookup



Attacks against the Domain Name System

DNS Cache Poisoning

- Goal: Directing users to malicious websites
- Approach: Convincing a resolver that a domain name has a different IP
- Demonstrated by Dan Kaminsky in 2008
- Similar vulnerabilities found, e.g. by [Herzberg et al. \(2013\)](#) and [Man et al. \(2020\)](#)



Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dan_Kaminsky

Cache Poisoning



6.6.6.6



Recursive
Resolver



bth.se

194.47.129.10

Cache Poisoning



What is the IP
address of
www.bth.se.?



Recursive
Resolver




bth.se

194.47.129.10




Cache Poisoning




Cache Poisoning




| What is the IP address of www.bth.se.? | |
|---|-------|
| Source Port | 553 |
| Query ID | 54375 |



Cache Poisoning



Cache Poisoning



DNS Cache Poisoning

- Proposed solutions:
 - Randomize source port (adds another 2^{16} possibilities)
 - Randomize query name ([Www.BTh.sE](http://www.BTh.sE))
- Only one real solution:
 - DNSSEC

The DNS Security Extensions




DNSSEC

- Adds integrity and authenticity to DNS
- Published as RFCs in 2005
- Gained more traction after Kaminsky Attack
- Allows zone operators to **sign their records** using **public key cryptography**
- Allows recursive resolvers to **validate the signatures**


DNSSEC

- Adds keys (DNSKEY resource record)
 - Public key and private key
- Adds signatures (RRSIG resource record)
- Adds proof of non-existence (NSEC resource record)

DNSSEC Lookup




DNSSEC Lookup



```
dig +multiline @a.ns.se www.bth.se +dnssec
```

DNSSEC Lookup



DNSSEC Lookup




Cryptographic Algorithm

| The IP address of www.bth.se. is | |
|----------------------------------|---|
| A | 213.52.129.125 |
| RRSIG | RRSIG A <u>8</u> 3 86400 20201214034302 20201207034013 1728 bth.se. YrvWCTqmsWgflYFALlZwUWYZ1fC wGsYFOOBYbaUefqcP ... |



Recursive
Resolver



bth.se

Algorithm 8: RSA/SHA-256
Full list [here](#)


DNSSEC Lookup




Time to live of covered record

The IP address of `www.bth.se.` is

| | |
|-------|--|
| A | 213.52.129.125 |
| RRSIG | RRSIG A 8 3 <u>86400</u> 20201214034302 20201207034013 1728 bth.se. YrvWCTqmsWgflYFAlZwUWYZ1fC wGsYFOOBYbaUefqcP ... |



Recursive
Resolver




bth.se

DNSSEC Lookup




Inception and validity of signature

| The IP address of www.bth.se. is | |
|----------------------------------|---|
| A | 213.52.129.125 |
| RRSIG | RRSIG A 8 3 86400 <u>20201214034302 20201207034013</u> 1728 bth.se. YrvWCTqmsWgflYFALlZwUWYZ1fC wGsYFOOBYbaUefqcP ... |




Recursive
Resolver




bth.se


DNSSEC Lookup



DNSSEC Lookup



DNSSEC Lookup




DNSSEC Lookup



| Cached | |
|--------|------------|
| A | www.bth.se |
| RRSIG | www.bth.se |

*What is the public
key of
bth.se.?*



bth.se

DNSSEC Lookup



```
dig +multiline @a.ns.se bth.se DNSKEY +dnssec
```

The key of bth.se. is

DNSKEY


DNSKEY 256 3 8
AwEAAAb3i8bDp5rhukbsz2PKTO3/9B
kV9fpf gbXWKS3Rx ...
(ZSK; key id = 1728;)



Recursive
Resolver


Cached

| | |
|--------|------------|
| A | www.bth.se |
| RRSIG | www.bth.se |
| DNSKEY | bth.se. |




bth.se


Trust in DNSSEC




Trust in DNSSEC




Trust in DNSSEC




Trust in DNSSEC




Trust in DNSSEC



Trust in DNSSEC



Trust in DNSSEC



DNSSEC Lookup



Recursive
Resolver



| Cached | |
|--------|---------------|
| A | www.bth.se |
| RRSIG | www.bth.se |
| DNSKEY | bth.se. |
| DS | DNSKEY bth.se |
| DNSKEY | .se |
| DS | DNSKEY se. |
| DNSKEY | .(root) |



Root



.se



bth.se



DNSSEC set up


- Operators often use two keys:
 - Zone Signing Key (ZSK) to sign the resource records (A, AAAA, MX)
 - Key Signing Key (KSK) to sign the ZSK
 - DS record is the hash of the KSK
- Makes key operations easier
 - Exchanging keys, without interaction with the parent
 - Different security model: e.g. lower security for ZSK
- KSK and ZSK can be combined in a Combined Signing Key (CSK)

Visualizing and Debugging DNSSEC

- Helpful tool: **dnsviz**
- Correct and working example sidnlabs.nl:
<https://dnsviz.net/d/sidnlabs.nl/X8l8rA/dnssec/>
- Weird but working example bth.se:
<https://dnsviz.net/d/bth.se/X89Wog/dnssec/>
- Broken example (expired signatures):
<https://dnsviz.net/d/servfail.nl/X5wKQA/dnssec/>

DNSSEC Deployment


Signed Domain Names



- Signing (<https://stats.dnssec-tools.org/>)
- ~370M domain names registered
- > 50% of all .nl and .se domain names are signed

DNSSEC Deployment

Clients using validating resolvers (%)



- Validation (<https://stats.labs.apnic.net/dnssec/XA>)
- ~ 90% in .se (!), ~50% in .nl (☹)

DNSSEC Downsides

- Makes DNS more complicated
- Misconfigurations can lead to rendering your own domain offline
 - E.g. when replacing a KSK
 - Or when forget to update signatures
- Not much client-side validation (but Apple is considering it)
- Larger payload makes DNSSEC interesting for DDoS reflection attacks
 - `dig A www.bth.se +multiline = 55 bytes`
 - `dig A www.bth.se +multiline +dnssec = 349 bytes`
 - `dig DNSKEY bth.se +multiline +dnssec = 2021 bytes`

Getting started with DNS(SEC)

- DNS Software:
 - Bind9 (Name Server & Resolver)
 - Unbound (Resolver)
 - NSD (Name Server)
- Tools:
 - Dig (command line tool)
 - Dnsviz (dnsviz.net)
- Further reading:
 - <https://powerdns.org/hello-dns/> (introduction to DNS)
 - IETF Request for Comments (RFCs)

Other DNS challenges

Confidentiality

- DNS queries can leak sensitive information
- Local networks (e.g. coffeeshops or hotel W-LAN) intercept and manipulate DNS queries
- ISPs sell DNS query data

→ Encrypt DNS traffic

- DNS over TLS (DoT)
- DNS over HTTPS (DoH)



Q&A

www.sidnlabs.nl | stats.sidnlabs.nl

Moritz Müller
Research Engineer
moritz.muller@sidn.nl