

Cyber security cOmpeteNCe fOr Research anD InnovAtion

Collaborative DDoS Mitigation & The DDoS Clearing House

Thijs van den Hout (SIDN Labs)

Partners: SIDN, University of Twente, Telecom Italia, FORTH, University of Zurich, SURF, University of Lancaster, CODE, Siemens





DDoS remains relevant



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Problem


- Mature DDoS mitigation services (e.g., scrubbing), routinely handling large numbers of DDoS attacks
- BUT no sharing of DDoS data and expertise between organizations
 - Increases response time and prevents learning because of limited view
 - Reduces innovation of mitigation processes and systems at ecosystem level
 - DDoS data "stuck" in systems of DDoS mitigation providers
- Increases probability of societal disruptions through online services



Collaborative DDoS Mitigation

Goal: Improve collective DDoS resilience with additional activities

- + Sharing
 - DDoS metadata
 - Mitigation strategies
 - Tools and services
- + Practice together
 - DDoS drills
 - Cyber ranges







Examples

- Network playbook sharing for DNS Anycast (Tech talk II)
- IXP scrubber (Tech talk III)
- MANRS (Mutually Agreed Norms for Routing Security)
- DDoS Clearing House




DDoS Clearing House

- Sharing of **DDoS fingerprints** between organizations
- Generic concept: Anti-DDoS Coalitions across sectors, Member States, business units, etc.
- Extends DDoS protection services that service providers use and does not replace them



DDoS Clearing House





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DDoS Fingerprint Example

fingerprint a38e5062b69fd7b8c5194fa7698398a7 attack vectors: [{ service: "HTTP" protocol: "TCP" source port: 80 fraction_of_attack: 1.0 destination_ports: "random" TCP_flags: {**A**....: 0.989 } nr flows: 5077 nr_packets: 20308000 nr_megabytes: 30599 time_start: "2022-01-23 01:28:00" time_end: "2022-01-23 01:29:56" duration seconds: 116 source_ips: [*31.000.148.00* **** 3] target: "Anonymous" tags: ["TCP "TCP ACK flag attack" 1 key: "a38e5062b69fd7b8c5194fa7698398a7" time start: "2022-01-23 01:28:00" duration seconds: 116 total_flows: 5077 total_megabytes: 30599 total_packets: 20308000 total_ips: 4 avg_bps: 2110318068 avg_pps: 175068 avg_Bpp: 1506 submitter: "thijs" submit_timestamp: "2022-01-25T13:50:13.818348" shareable: False





Key innovations

- Bridge **multidisciplinary gap** to deployment, more than tech!
- **Opensource design** that we make available through a "cookbook"
 - Technology, legal, organizational, lessons learned based on pilots
 - Enable federations of organizations to set up their own anti-DDoS coalition
 - Main use case is the Dutch Anti-DDoS Coalition (NL-ADC)
- Operates across heterogeneous networks and offers rich set of services



DDoS Clearing House pilots

- The Netherlands
 - In the existing Dutch Anti-DDoS Coalition (17 partners)
 - Cross-sectoral
 - One producer of fingerprints
- Italy
 - Smaller scale: Telecom Italia SOC & Security Lab + University of Turin
 - Intra-organizational
 - MISP





DDoS Testbed


- Representative environment used to
 - Test the technical developments of the Clearing House
 - Demonstrate our work
 - Cyber range for practicing DDoS

- DDoS traffic simulator
 - Small scale
 - Dashboard for attack customization



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What's next?

• DDoS Clearing House Cookbook

• Production phase at the NL-ADC

• Wrap up CONCORDIA with demonstration & reports





Contact

Research Institute CODE Carl-Wery-Straße 22 81739 Munich Germany

contact@concordia-h2020.eu

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Dutch Anti-DDoS Coalition: https://www.nomoreddos.org/en/

Clearing house on GitHub: https://github.com/ddos-clearing-house/

Thijs van den Hout thijs.vandenhout@sidn.nl @thijsvandenhout



