

A testbed to evaluate post-quantum cryptography for DNSSEC


Caspar Schutijser

Radboud Digital Security group Lunch Talk
October 2, 2024

.nl

SIDN Labs is the research arm of SIDN

- Goal: further increase the security of the Internet, with a special focus on .nl and the Netherlands
- Applied technical research: large-scale Internet measurements, prototyping new Internet systems, evaluating them, contributing to standards
- Results are public and generic (e.g., measurement methods and insights, designs, software) plus SIDN-specific adaptations for SIDN teams



KWANTUM


KWANTUM

MUTIAMMÄ

MUTIAMMÄ

gö...inen





Polynomial-Time Algorithms for Prime Factorization and Discrete Logarithms on a Quantum Computer*


Peter W. Shor[†]

Abstract



A digital computer is generally believed to be an efficient universal computing device; that is, it is believed able to simulate any physical computing device with an increase in computation time by at most a polynomial factor. This may not be true when quantum mechanics is taken into consideration. This paper considers factoring integers and finding discrete logarithms, two problems which are generally thought to be hard on a classical computer and which have been used as the basis of several proposed cryptosystems. Efficient randomized algorithms are given for these two problems on a hypothetical quantum computer. These algorithms take a number of steps polynomial in the input size, e.g., the number of digits of the integer to be factored.

Keywords: algorithmic number theory, prime factorization, discrete logarithms, Church's thesis, quantum computers, foundations of quantum mechanics, spin systems, Fourier transforms


AMS subject classifications: 81P10, 11Y05, 68Q10, 03D10



Quantum computers and cryptographic keys



CLASSICAL



QUANTUM


TECHNOLOGIE

De quantumcomputer zou alle digitale geheimen kunnen kraken. Hoe is dat te voorkomen?

Nog dit decennium is de quantumcomputer er, volgens sommige experts. Die zou de cyberbeveiliging kunnen kraken die nu wordt gebruikt voor alles van staats- en bankgeheimen tot chatgesprekken. Hoe maak je de versleuteling 'quantumveilig'? Daar wordt hard aan gewerkt.

Frank Rensen 1 december 2023, 10:30







1180 physical qubits

Algorithm	Key size	Security	Logical qubits	Physical qubits	Time to break
RSA	1024 bits	80 bits	2.290	~ 2.560.000 bits	3.5 hours
RSA	2048 bits	112 bits	4.338	~ 6.200.000 bits	29 hours
RSA	4096 bits	128 bits	8.434	~ 14.700.000 bits	10 days
ECC	256 bits	128 bits	2.330	~ 3.210.000 bits	11 hours

Source: National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine 2018. Quantum Computing: Progress and Prospects. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press.
<https://doi.org/10.17226/25196>. Tabel 4.1







2a00:d78:0:712:94:198:159:35




Why is it when something happens, it's always you three?



DNS

BGP

DHCP



"IT'S ALWAYS DNS"

ABRAHAM LINCOLN



User



Resolver



Authoritative
nameservers



User


Where can I find
www.example.nl ?




Resolver



Authoritative
nameservers







Where can I find
www.example.nl ?



Where can I find
www.example.nl ?

The address is
2a00:d78:0:712:94:198:159:35



.



nl



example.nl



Where can I find
www.example.nl ?



The address is
2a00:d78:0:712:94:198:159:35



.



nl



example.nl

utun10

dns

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
4	0.786990	94.198.158.3	10.20.7.40	DNS	83	Standard query 0x4903 AAAA example.nl OPT
5	0.788696	10.20.7.40	94.198.158.3	DNS	99	Standard query response 0x4903 AAAA example.nl AAAA 2...
6	0.834830	94.198.158.3	10.20.7.40	DNS	84	Standard query 0xa03d AAAA sidnlabs.nl OPT
7	0.842772	10.20.7.40	94.198.158.3	DNS	100	Standard query response 0xa03d AAAA sidnlabs.nl AAAA ...
8	0.887276	94.198.158.3	10.20.7.40	DNS	81	Standard query 0x1d23 AAAA pkic.org OPT
9	0.895848	10.20.7.40	94.198.158.3	DNS	153	Standard query response 0x1d23 AAAA pkic.org AAAA 260...

... .. 0000 = reply code: no error (0)

Questions: 1
 Answer RRs: 1
 Authority RRs: 0
 Additional RRs: 1

- Queries
 - > example.nl: type AAAA, class IN
- Answers
 - > example.nl: type AAAA, class IN, addr 2a00:d78:0:712:94:198:159:35
 - Name: example.nl
 - Type: AAAA (IPv6 Address) (28)
 - Class: IN (0x0001)
 - Time to live: 3367

Data length: 16
 AAAA Address: 2a00:d78:0:712:94:198:159:35

> Additional records

```

0040 00 01 00 00 0d 27 00 10 2a 00 0d 78 00 00 07 12  ....'..*..x....
0050 00 94 01 98 01 59 00 35 00 00 29 04 d0 00 00 00  ....Y.5 ..)....
  
```

Response Length (dns.resp.len), 2 bytes

Packets: 44 · Displayed: 6 (13.6%) · Dropped: 0 (0.0%) · Profile: Default



DoH, DoT, DNScrypt
<https://dns4all.eu/>

X25519Kyber768



DNSSEC

www.example.nl



.



nl



example.nl



Where can I find
www.example.nl ?

???




The address is
2a00:d78:0:712:94:198:159:35



The address is
2a00:d78:0:712:94:198:159:35



www.example.nl



www.example.nl



Where can I find
www.example.nl ?



Where can I find
www.example.nl ?


Ask nl



.

nl


example.nl




We're here

PQC standards available

DNSSEC vulnerable (perhaps)



Time to deploy new algorithm in DNSSEC, +- 10 years



Timeline showing deployment of ECDSA256, from 'Making DNSSEC Future Proof' by dr. Moritz Müller.





Requirements

Prio	Requirement	Good	Accepted Conditionally
#1	Signature Size	$\leq 1,232$ bytes	—
#2	Validation Speed	$\geq 1,000$ sig/s	—
#3	Key Size	≤ 64 kilobytes	> 64 kilobytes
#4	Signing Speed	≥ 100 sig/s	—


Table 2: Requirements for quantum-safe algorithms.




Jürgen Henn – 11foot8.com








Post-quantum Algorithms Testing and Analysis for the DNS



PATAD testbed: plan and experiment

1) Test infrastructure



2) The PQC algorithm that we want to test








3) The measurements we want to perform

Sign 100x, verify 100x, calculate the averages



PATAD testbed: building a testbed



PATAD testbed: experiment with MAYO-2

Resolvers




exp1-resolver



exp1-resolver-dnssec



laptop



Authoritative nameservers



exp1-root



exp1-nl



exp1-sidnlabs

Supported PQC algorithms:

- 251: Falcon-512
- 250: SQISign-1
- 249: MAYO-2**



Demo?

```
techtalk — -zsh — 104x28  
[elmer@mbp /tmp/techtalk]$
```

PATAD testbed is available as open source software

- Specify your own topology.
- Run your own experiments!
- More information: patad.sidnlabs.nl

Next steps



Develop more PQC DNSSEC components



Improve testbed infrastructure



Perform experiments on our testbed



Encourage others to use testbed and to work together

PATAD blog appeared on:



Research partners:



**UNIVERSITY
OF TWENTE.**



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<https://www.sidn.nl/en/work-at-sidn>

Wanna know more? Contact Inge Loeff at our HR team at inge.loeff@sidn.nl



Thanks for your attention

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