



Developing and Evaluating a DDoS Clearing House for Europe Euritas Summit, Brussels, Sep 30, 2021

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
Partners: SIDN, University of Twente, Telecom Italia, FORTH, University of Zurich, SURF, University of Lancaster, CODE

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High-impact DDoS Examples





Reduced Digital Autonomy


- Society increasingly depends on online services => disruptions
- DDoS mitigation services (e.g., scrubbing) getting more important
 - Fortunately, providers usually able to routinely handle DDoS attacks
 - For example, NBIP/NaWas handled 715 attacks in Q2 2021, 164Gbps peak rate [1]
 - DDoS attacks increasingly involve ransom demands [2]
- But no sharing of DDoS intelligence and expertise across organizations
 - Lowers response time and learning because of limited victim-specific view
 - Reduces innovation of mitigation processes and systems at ecosystem level
 - DDoS data "stuck" in systems of (US-based) DDoS mitigation providers

^[1] https://www.nbip.nl/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/NBIP-Infographic-DDoS-data-Q2-2021-EN.pdf[2] https://www.zdnet.com/article/voip-company-battles-massive-ransom-ddos-attack/



Need: "DDoS early warning system"

Earthquake early warning systems



https://www.usgs.gov/media/images/earthquakesensor-density-california-versus-japan

Examples of protective earthquake actions:

- Safely stop vehicles (cars, trains)
- Open elevator doors
- Shut down production lines
- Stop delicate medical procedures
- Protect electricity grid



DDoS attacks:


- Potential victims prepare their networks
- DDoS sensors across organizations
- Capture incoming attacks





DDoS Clearing House Concept

- Continuous and automatic sharing of **DDoS fingerprints**, buys providers time (proactive)
- Extends DDoS protection services that service providers use and does not replace them
- Generic concept: across sectors, Member States, business units, etc.





Key innovations

- Bridge **multidisciplinary gap** to deployment, more than tech!
- Opensource design that we make available through a "cookbook"
 - Technology, legal, organizational, lessons learned based on pilots
 - Enable federations of organizations to set up their own DDoS clearing house
 - Main use case is the Dutch Anti-DDoS Coalition (NL-ADC)
- Operates across heterogeneous networks and offers rich set of services




Clearing House increases Digital Autonomy

- Increased insight of potential victims into DDoS attacks from their own narrow view to an ecosystem-wide view
- Increased control because the new insights give organizations more grip on how to handle DDoS attacks and the requirements for their DDoS mitigation facilities (their own or those of a contracted third party)
- ADCs also build up a joint **pool of expertise** independent of particular DDoS mitigation providers through drills and best common practices





Main Components and Data Flows







DDoS Fingerprint Example

```
{
 "attack_vector": [
      "src_ips":
        ommited;
     ],
      "attack_vector_key": "66f2e83fde0e6351d3f5ad967c6230aa3b60dbc498ad13b074296cb5f84c7734",
      "one_line_fingerprint": "{'dns_gry_type': 1, 'ip_proto': 'UDP',
      'highest_protocol': 'DNS', 'dns_gry_name': 'a.packetdevil.com',
      'frame_len': 1514, 'udp_length': 4103, 'srcport': 53,
      'fragmentation': True, 'src_ips': 'omitted'}"
    3
  ],
  "start_time": "2013-08-14 23:04:00",
  "duration_sec": 0.16,
 "total_dst_ports": 4649,
  "avg_bps": 143426993,
  "total_packets": 16471,
 "ddos_attack_key": "44518107642b9ac7098174a16cbf220395c862bf26389c734e0b109b318e9291",
  "key": "44518107642b9ac",
  "total_ips": 2065.
  "tags":
    "AMPLIFICATION".
    "DNS",
    "FRAGMENTATION",
    "UDP_SUSPECT_LENGTH",
    "DNS_QUERY".
    "SINGLE_VECTOR_ATTACK"
  ٦
```






Component Maturity Indication

Name	Function	Maturity
Dissector	Generate DDoS fingerprints using PCAP files or flow data	High
DDoSDB	Insert, update, search, and retrieve DDoS fingerprints	High
Converter	Generate mitigation rules based on DDoS fingerprints	Medium
DDoS Grid	Dashboard for the visualization of DDoS fingerprints	High
IP Address Analyzer	Enriches fingerprints with details about IP addresses involved in an attack, based on measurements	Low
DDoS Tool Analyzer	Generate DDoS fingerprints of tools used to launch DDoS attacks	Low
MISP Exporter	Generate MISP events based on DDoS fingerprints	Medium

Overall: **stable framework**, most thrusts in the Dissector (adding and updating DDoS fingerprinting algorithms) and in the Converter (adding and updating rule-specific converters).




- The "DDoS target" manually initiates a stream of test traffic to itself through distributed cloud VMs
- Target's Dissector creates fingerprint and sends it to the other partners through DDoS-DB, without PII
- Receivers locally construct filtering rules and manually initiate the same stream to **test the rules**







DDoS clearing house in the Netherlands



- DDoS clearing house R&D
- Clearing house distributed simulator
- Technical evaluation through pilots in the Netherlands and Italy
- DDoS clearing house cookbook

- Sharing of operational experience
- Large-scale multi-party DDoS drills
- **DDoS clearing house operations**
- Operational ADC organization

CONCORDIA is funded by the European Union's Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation program under Grant Agreement No 830927. Project website: <u>https://www.concordia-h2020.eu/</u>






Dutch Anti-DDoS Coalition (NL-ADC)





Approach

- Objective: further improve the resilience of Dutch critical services
- Strategies: sharing of DDoS measurements (clearing house), large scale collaborative drills, sharing expertise





NL-ADC Status

- Approved consortium agreement
- Fee-based budget (EUR 114K total)
- Structure of WGs, clearing house operator and software developer
- Core team governing the initiative





DDoS Clearing House Planning @NL-ADC

Phase		Q1-2021	Q2-2021	Q3-2021	Q4-2021	Q1-2022	Q2-2022
-1	Distributed testbed						
0	Pilot				^		
1	Basic production						
2	Full production						

Dev: CONCORDIA team Ops: SIDN Labs + CONCORDIA team

Dev: CONCORDIA team Ops: SIDN Labs + NL-ADC members Dev: CONCORDIA team Ops: database operator (NBIP) + NL-ADC members

Dev: software developer (TBD) Ops: database operator (NBIP) + NL-ADC members



DDoS Challenges for Public Administrations

- Fight DDoS attacks collaboratively ^(C)
- Keep the problem of DDoS attacks on the public and gov't radar
- Get your DDoS measurements from your third-party providers
- Governments in unique position to lead by example





Further reading

https://www.sidnlabs.nl/en/news-and-blogs/new-ddos-classifiers-for-the-ddosclearing-house

<u>https://www.sidnlabs.nl/en/news-and-blogs/work-in-progress-the-concordia-platform-for-threat-intelligence</u>

https://www.sidnlabs.nl/en/news-and-blogs/new-version-of-the-ddos-clearing-housecore-components

https://www.sidnlabs.nl/en/news-and-blogs/dutch-anti-ddos-coalition-lessonslearned-and-the-way-forward

https://www.sidnlabs.nl/en/news-and-blogs/setting-up-a-national-ddos-clearing-house

https://www.sidnlabs.nl/en/news-and-blogs/increasing-the-netherlands-ddosresilience-together





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Follow us

Dutch Anti-DDoS Coalition: https://www.nomoreddos.org/en/

Clearing house on GitHub: https://github.com/ddos-clearing-house/

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